Thursday, August 30, 2007

未來的開始


今日,我30歲。

根據官方資料,今時今日特區男性人民嘅平均壽命係79歲。即係話,孫柏文壽 命只要有平均咁好,就會睇到鄧小平同志為特區定下「五十年不變」嘅終結,2047年。噚日就幫自己做回顧,今日就同大家諗吓我哋嘅未來。


大家每日參與嘅金 融市場,特別係股票買賣,無時無刻跳動嘅價格,反映緊市場對未來嘅預測。所以,作為一個財經口水佬,預測未來係工作嘅根本。

繼續投資買白銀

然, 大家可能會話:「唔好話2047年會點,講中聽日會點都已經好勁。」同意,不過有啲嘢都係值得做吓預測。理由係,有啲嘢聽日會點,大家心目中會好肯定,不 過問大家2047會點,就真係完全唔知。例如,我問你:「聽日起身邊個係特首?」相信大家都識答。不過問你:「2047年特首會係邊個?」你分分鐘反問 我:「仲有冇特區都未知啦!」所以諗吓未來會點,可以爆發好多新思維。

首先,大家可能想知,由今日到2047年,有啲乜好投資。大家肯定以為,孫柏文作為「白銀戰隊隊長」,一定又話「一注獨贏買白銀」。冇錯,我相信到2047年時,世界各國都仲係會用單憑信心做保證嘅紙幣fiat currency做法定貨幣。即係各國人民繼續被「紙幣狂魔」蹂躪,紙幣嘅購買力將會不斷削弱,買白銀絕對錯。

長線投資生仔女

不 過,如果大家今日問我,由今日到2047年最好嘅投資係乜,我覺得一定係生番幾個仔女。跟住投入好多心機、時間,做大量嘅人力資源投資。

黃金、白銀係啲非 常消極、防禦性高嘅投資。40、50年長嘅時間,大家可以做啲風險較高嘅投資,而冇乜投資嘅風險高得過生仔女,所以回報亦一樣高。我,係樂觀嘅。

再講,呢個世 上冇任何人造力量,強大得過人口變化。所以長遠來說,孫柏文最擔心就係我國嘅「一孩政策」。就有如97年,特區政府將百分百香港人兒童拒於境外,種下今日唔夠後生仔嘅世界。未來可能係我國嘅,不過可以係幾耐?

Wednesday, August 29, 2007

廿歲年代的句號

聽日,我就30歲。

如果大家對數學略懂一二,應該計到孫柏文1977年出世。今日 寫呢篇文,我唔會話係代表一代人嘅說話,只係同大家分享自己嘅少少經歷,如果你同我年齡差唔多,希望會有啲共鳴。

96年,卒之搵到間花旗國嘅大學肯收我, 就係咁,我喺聽聞香港最風光嘅日子出國留學。大家可能會問:「點解用『聽聞』呢兩個字?」原因係自己根本未試過喺嗰啲日子搵錢,當年聽啲諗過移民嘅長輩 話:「點走呀?錢喺香港咁易搵!」對我嚟講,真係一個傳說。

細細個聽過兩句「真言」,第一句係「香港地少人多」,如果呢個係上聯,下聯就係「所以炒樓必 勝」。對我嚟講,又係一個傳說。樓,我冇份炒。

缺席香港風光日子

我第一次自己落場炒股票,係大學第一年回港放暑假。北京控股 (395)我冇抽,不過「一籃子紅籌」輪就有炒。炒到8月中,因為要返學,所以清倉。好彩。

到99、千禧年,我畢業。「錢喺香港咁易搵!」嘅傳說已經完全 幻滅。我嗰屆嘅畢業生,好多被特區之亂嚇怕,為咗搵食讀電腦系。雖然佢哋未有師兄Larry Page或Bill Joy咁勁,不過每次有人話香港人「不懂科技」,我就會記起我啲到今時今日仲流落異鄉嘅舊同學。

除咗讀電腦,我嗰屆叻嘅人、喺花旗國搵到工嘅人,到今日仲係未返。我當年讀書冇搵工,諗住去搞dot com,點知未開始,泡沫已經爆破。dot com,我冇份搞。

不過當時23歲一份熱誠,諗住為其他市民提供一個「自由市場」嘅立法會選擇,所以走去參選。結果?有如《南華早報》幾日前話 「humiliating defeat」。

千禧年,盈科數碼動力,我炒過,12蚊上車,18蚊落車。好彩。

曾經雙失炒過賺過

之後幾年特區經濟點,毋須多講。我試過好耐冇工返、冇書讀。我,曾經雙失過。嗰種每日慢慢不斷摧毀自信嘅感受,殘酷。不過,雙失嘅日子,亦係我睇、讀最多嘢嘅日子,為之後做分析員打基礎。得閒就係咁。

今日,就當我為自己嘅廿歲年代畫上句號。不過畫之前,我想向所有我30年嚟整喊過嘅女人道歉,當時我可能愛妳 不夠,又或太過愛妳,點都好,I love you and I am sorry。

聽日,就係我人生新嘅一頁。

Tuesday, August 28, 2007

一注獨贏買江銅:到價!

多謝各位《金手指》fan屎支持!

孫柏文喺今年4月10日,叫大家「一注獨贏買江銅」。咁江西銅業(358)喺4月9日嘅收市價,就係10.32元,不過到4月10日開市時,已經裂口高開,開市價10.8元。

冇辦法,《金手指》嘅「一注獨贏」品牌,實在太強,所以裂口高開不足為奇。當日,我為大家提供咗16元嘅目標價,以建議日開市價嘅10.8元計,即係話會升48%。到噚日,江銅就成功升穿我嘅目標價。



4月我建議大家買江銅嘅理由,係因睇江銅06年第三季業績,當時銅價維持大約7600元1噸,江銅就賺大約0.5元。只要全年銅價平均喺同一水平,江銅就會賺2元一股。呢個盈利計算已經非常保守,因為完全假設江銅嘅生產量冇增長。

只 要市場覺得銅價能徘徊7600元1噸水平,而唔係泡沫,市場可以接受江銅嘅市盈率,亦可以攀升。當時我話過:「江銅一年可以每股賺兩元,而如果市盈率係8 倍,即係話股價就會16元一股。」無獨有偶,由4月1日至今,銅價平均真係徘徊喺7600元1噸水平,而市場亦好似接受呢個唔係泡沫。江銅升穿我嘅目標 價,唔係冇根據。

咁仲有冇得升

當然,如果睇江銅股價走勢圖,我咁多理論都好,由建議日到7月初曾經升上15.74元一股。到 「大奇迹日」,全日最低見過10.4元,仲低過建議日開市價。江銅居然可以喺之後嘅6個交易日,由低過建議價到升穿目標價。我當然係繼續話係因市場卒之明 白以上嘅理由,所以升。不過,大家就可能覺得係大陸同胞可以「炒股自由行」,炒AH股折讓,所以升。

無謂拗,中就得。

最後,大家一定會問:「究竟江銅仲有 冇得升?」我只可以話,用港元計,江銅A股噚日收42.87元一股,仲有冇得升?你話呢?

Monday, August 27, 2007

水草綁蟹 建築面積

呢個周末,有個叫「billy」嘅網友,喺小弟嘅blog留言,問孫柏文:「螃蟹單嘢呀,唔知你觀點係咪同我一樣?希望你寫吓教育大眾。」

最初,我唔係好明「螃蟹單嘢」係講緊啲乜,後來再問billy之後,先至知道原來講緊海關「揭發」有賣蟹商人「呃秤」。「呃秤」手法就係用好多同好粗嘅水草綁蟹,跟住消費者買蟹嘅時候,商人就會水草連蟹一齊秤。最差個案,蟹本身重量只係總重量嘅37%。

自由市場價錢反映

主 流傳媒嘅指定反射式動作,相信我都無需要同大家講,又係喊打喊殺,「奸商」前、「奸商」後。

雖然海關「揭發」賣蟹商人「呃秤」,不過,我想問:「究竟海關 有冇睇埋蟹商與蟹商之間嘅賣價差別?」我呢啲自由市場信徒,絕對相信如果一個蟹商長期呃秤,佢可以叫嘅賣價一定打折扣。甚至可以相信,如果蟹佔總重量得 37%,嗰個蟹販嘅賣價就應該比起蟹佔總重量100%嘅賣價,少63%。除非特區所有螃蟹賣同一個價錢,市場價格係會調節反映現實。

其實,呢個情況同特區 賣樓一樣,多年來,好多硬膠嘅人,成日都話要立法規定啲人用實用面積,而唔准用建築面積。講真,除非特區所有住宅樓宇劃一呎價,如果唔係劃一,樓宇呎價可 以自由浮動,一個樓盤嘅實用面積比率偏低,呎價係會反映。

再講,孫柏文鄉下喺寧波鎮海, 我細細個開始已經食好多大閘蟹。試問,有邊個食過大閘蟹嘅人,未試過食一隻「空心蟹」?咁樣係咪呃人?係咪又要拉人?

再問,如果有實際用途,用嚟防止螃蟹鉗傷人嘅水 草,因為唔食得落肚所以唔准計埋,咁唔食得嘅蟹殼點算?唔通淨係可以計蟹肉?如果碰正個廣東佬,食大閘蟹時連蟹肉都唔食,淨係食膏,係咪要拉晒計埋蟹肉嘅 商人?

最後,講起「蟹」同「樓」,我想提提大家今晚花旗國將會公佈樓宇二手市場,大家密切留意,因為應該會比預期差。

Saturday, August 25, 2007

To that "anon" that loves my blog

Here is the comment one "anon" has left me.

Well, first of all, someone leaving comments as "anon". I am not going to judge.

You all can.

Anyhow, there has recently been an "anon" who has been leaving a lot of messages on my blog. Perhaps cloaked with anonymity, or perhaps due to the untimely death of its maternal parent, the "anon" has been, well... rude.

Someone leaving rude comments as "anon"... Once again, you all can judge.

This last particular comment left by "anon", was left in the message section of my previous entry... Quoting I about my 13 Hutchison's recommendation at the beginning.

"... "Hutchison is higher than when I suggested to buy"

So 阿Q. Relative to the index, Hutch has been a huge underperformer since your recommendation. It is a hard fact...still u r trying to twist it...this reflects how childish u r...

If you can't take any critisim, just close your blog. Or simply do not accept any comments..."

Anyhow, this "anon" obviously has neglected to read my previous posting regarding anon posts. But hey, what would you expect, for "anon" is a loyal fan of this blog. (yes admit it, you love coming here hor hor hor) My fans are sloppy this way...

So "anon" have no idea that I am actually letting it leave messages here.

But lets get back to my hutch recommendation. Why did I recommend? you might ask...

odds.

its all about the odds...

If it works, Hutch goes to 100

If it doesn't, Hutch stays the same. No downside.

When a stock is priced to destruction, it is not hard to beat expectations.

And if only (really low) expectations are met, then the stock doesn't move.

No downside. X-Series is a true and sincere attempt by 3 to revolutionize the way unlimited-wireless-broadband-internet access is priced. I liked the odds. With the way the stock gapped up on my recommendation day, it seems a lot of you liked the odds too.

Also, in a previous entry, the "anon" called me a "smart ass". I am sure 99.999% of you (including my parents) agree with this particular assessment. That there is not a single whiff of "expert" from me. That every stock I recommend, you just can't jump in automatically, because I am just a "smart ass".

WHICH MAKES THE GAPPING UP THAT DAY THE BETTER. That despite the recommendation coming from a "smart ass", the reasoning and analysis was strong enough for people going in to buy! hahahaha

I need to ask "anon". Seriously, is odds, cost/benefit, beyond your grasp? Seriously. Is it Beyond your grasp? Yup it is! hahahahah The masses does get it.

It is when a stock is priced to perfection, that the odds does not favour the stock. I have addressed the issue of opportunity costs in my previous Chinese entry.

I need to ask "anon". Why are you so bothered?

You seem really bothered by my writing.

Like seriously... Why are you so bothered? hahhahaaha

And why, when you are so bothered, do you keep coming back? You love me hor hor hor THATS WHY! admission is the first step to the cure.

Here's a video for you. Notice how the reverend answers with 17 sec left in the video.
You are Lauren Cooper.



PS. This policy is once again in effect.
PPS. Seems like "anon" uses broadband. For your IP address ... = )

Friday, August 24, 2007

撤銷「一注獨贏買和黃」


噚日,和黃(013)公佈07上半年業績。對孫柏文嚟講,用兩個字總結,好差。

大家可能會話:「和黃業績好似合乎預期喎,點解你會話好差?」和黃業績,只係合乎市場預期,而唔係我嘅預期。我喺舊年11月22日叫大家「一注獨贏買和黃」,有效12個月嘅目標價仲定喺100元,即係比建議當日,和黃開市價嘅71.95元,高39%。

孫柏文用得「一注獨贏」呢四個字,和黃就唔可以只係交番「合乎市場預期」畀我。就算唔係大紅大紫,都要一鳴驚人。

傷心:業績冇驚喜

當 時,我叫大家買和黃係因旗下嘅3,拋棄以前嘅典型電訊硬膠收費模式,收費方法進行文化大革命,推出「無線寬頻上網服務」叫X-Series。我當時覺得X -Series應該可以令3化腐朽為神奇,而因我對3嘅樂觀預期,當時股價絕對未反映,所以建議大家去買。

不過,噚日睇和黃業績,喺3最先推出X- Series嘅愛爾蘭同前宗主國市場,已簽合約形式嘅客戶增長數量,只有3%增長。就算X-Series服務,由推出至今口碑雖好,不過上唔到客就係上唔 到客。原先,我仲估和黃業績報告當中,將會最令我傷心嘅係佢哋話手上有好多次按投資,就算3救得番,股價都要下跌。不過佢哋冇,但係3都係唔得。

以前我曾經講過,因為「無線寬頻上網服務」X-Series嘅收費模式,已經係3G電訊服務可以畀顧客嘅最終極方案,所以如果X-Series救唔到3,3G本身真係一個冇得做嘅生意。

沽貨:因上唔到客

我唔知道X-Series唔好賣,係因其他例如WiFi嘅無線寬頻上網方法吸引啲, 定係因為X-Series要人用手機上網,而手機始終都唔好用,不過上唔到客就係上唔到客。

雖然,離開目標價有效限期仲有好幾個月,不過今日,我要撤銷 「一注獨贏買和黃」嘅建議。用噚日和黃77.2元收市價計算,係有錢賺(7.3%),不過輸咗機會成本,如果你係因為我嘅建議買咗和黃,今日就係時候放。

Thursday, August 23, 2007

Hutchison's 1H07 results...

Really sucked.

There are no other ways to describe its earnings from my SUPER BULLISH perspective.

和黃出業績 求神唔甩轆

今日,和黃(013)將會公布半年業績,孫柏文當然睇到實。大家作為《金手指》嘅 fan屎,都知道我會睇到實嘅原因,係因我喺舊年11月22日叫過大家「一注獨贏買和黃」。

當時,我叫大家買和黃,係因為和黃嘅3拋棄以前嘅硬膠收費模 式,收費方法進行文化大革命,卒之明白賣嘅只係「無線寬頻上網服務」。和黃改革嘅決心,甚至畀用戶可以用無線寬頻上網打電話同經互聯網send短訊,毋須 用原先吓吓計住嘅電訊服務。當今無線電訊界中,有乜嘢比起打電話voice同短訊sms更加「不可侵犯」、「神聖」,和黃揮刀斬呢兩隻sacred cows,足以證明佢哋嘅決心。

最緊要係從炒賣角度嚟睇,因市場覺得3G隨時會拖垮和黃,所以如果3G不但有救,仲大紅大紫嘅話,和黃就會大升特升。

冀和黃投資部 冇掂次按

建 議「一注獨贏」當日,和黃開市價係71.95元,而目標價係100元,有效期12個月。

今日,和黃最好係宣佈3嘅全球上客量突飛猛進,跟住仲要話上客費下 跌。只要EBIT好好睇睇,和黃就升。

不過,我對和黃係有憂慮。和黃上上下下嘅同事,出咗名「好醒」,而「最醒」嘅部門必屬佢哋炒嘢投資部。過去幾年,全 世界啲「最醒」嘅投資、對冲基金,好多都走咗去買包括次按債券等嘅衍生工具,所以求神拜佛,和黃嘅炒嘢部,千祈唔好甩轆,畀啲乜嘢「驚喜」我哋。

霍 建寧、陸法蘭,今日睇你哋點樣同一眾(包括李嘉誠)嘅股東交代!

撐扎鐵工人 拋空地產股

最後,離一離題。聽聞,職工盟李卓人成功籌款,有好多匿名嘅人捐錢,今後扎鐵工人罷工每日 有300元津貼。假設特區有3000個扎鐵工人,如果全面罷工,每日需要90萬元去維持。講真,如果我係一個對冲基金,我會每日攞90萬元出嚟,跟住只要 所有地盤停工,我可以拋空地產股,喺股市搵食。

Wednesday, August 22, 2007

心繫家國

早幾日,孫柏文覺得,平時作為一個散戶,已經好似俾啲大鱷拋嚟拋去咁,非常被動。 不過今時今日,就連啲大鱷都被時世掟嚟掟去時,作為散戶,更加完全無助。

不過,如果大家冇跟噚日個市,淨係睇吓啲收市價同點數,突然間郁都唔郁,更加得人 驚,亦都可能有好多疑團。

大陸股唔講,淨係見恒指升133點,得嗰0.6%,以呢排嘅波幅嚟計,真係好似冇郁一樣。不過,同時又見到金融類嘅港交所 (388)升6.2%,但係滙豐(005)又跌1.3%,真係搞到人scratch晒頭。

強國對壘結果難料

如果要孫柏文好 簡單咁解釋今日嘅情況,我就會用我姪仔本《小學生圖解成語詞典》裏面嘅「自相矛盾」嚟做比喻。話說,家陣特區股市,有兩個敵對,但又強大嘅力量對壘︰一 邊,係一支無堅不摧嘅矛(花旗國信貸危機),加一塊水火不侵嘅盾(祖國澎湃嘅資本)。答案係乜,讀過小學都明白,呢啲哲學嘢無謂多講。

花旗國,大家都知會 死得好肉酸。次按風暴已經蔓延到其他國家同信貸工具,全世界央行都開大水喉救火。撇開伯南克呢個學院派擺明要爆佢一大鑊,就算真係要救,各國政府都未必有 能力搞得掂。政府做啲嘢,當係表吓態囉,大家都係無謂放上心。滙豐,又點會有得升?

另一邊,係大家都知祖國鈔票氾濫到連豬肉都炒到飛天,炒股嘅就話唔怕買 貴啫,其他嘢真係貴啲都暴動。撞啱今年又真係周圍都落大雨,到處都水浸,食物真係唔可以貴,無可奈何之下,點都要排洪。幾十萬億嘅人仔存款,真係隊落香 港,炒乜都好啦,一定要響特區唯一嘅港交所買嘢。

港交所實發過豬頭

港交所不但喺香港壟斷,更加可以話係全世界唯一合法吸納中華人民共和國資金嘅壟斷,仲唔發過豬頭?升6.2%,升少咗啦!再重複一次,係幾十萬億存款嘅集散地!升6.2%,升少咗啦!大家,跟住我唱︰「起來……」

Tuesday, August 21, 2007

淡友食「神風」  有甚麼好做?

去到噚日中午收市,孫柏文覺得今個禮拜嘅股市,將會同上個禮拜一模一樣(見圖)。 噚日開市同上個禮拜一模一樣,受到對上嘅禮拜五聯儲局出手影響,裂口高開,跟住橫行。如無意外,橫行應該繼續到下午收市。

歐洲同花旗國嘅禮拜一股市,就會因為消化聯儲局出手消息,一樣都係橫行。繼而令特區股市喺禮拜二繼續橫行。

不過,到歐洲同花旗國嘅禮拜二,就會因為再有金融機構出事消息傳出,令佢哋跌到 一仆一碌。跟住特區股市就會喺禮拜三裂口低開,跌勢亦會持續到禮拜四,同至少禮拜五上午。

當然,絕不能排除喺花旗國禮拜四晚上時分,即特區禮拜五上午,聯儲局嚟次秘密會議,到禮拜五下午,就有啲番鬼佬大行進行「春江鴨」活動,見貨就掃。

大陸散戶會買乜?

作為一個淡友,就算上禮 拜五出現《大時代》奇迹日,全個禮拜都係跌好多。所以如果今個禮拜翻版,淡友絕對收貨。

最弊,呢個「戰狼300」式淡友圍攻好友嘅計劃,就好似當年戰無不 勝嘅蒙古軍,東征日本時,遇上日本人所稱嘅Kamikaze「神風」!淡友被殺個措手不及,屍橫遍野。

呢個從北方吹嚟嘅「神風」,就係中央政府完全放寬散 戶來港交所投資,即「炒股自由行」。相信好多人都講,同分析買乜好,我當然都有推介。首先,大家要記得呢次係大陸散戶來港,佢哋買一隻股嘅理由可能好奇 怪,原因可能炒股年資少或者訊息被封殺,今日就試吓role play。

滙豐唔係必掃貨

講受歡迎先。

,應該好,因無風險不歡,輪商發達。
長實和黃,因李嘉誠。
中石油中移動,因大陸冇得買。

再講唔受歡迎嘅股票。
滙豐,冇辦法,年資更淺,訊息更少嘅大陸散戶,都一定聽過「次按」呢兩個字。
孫柏文死撐?Yes,unfortunately。

最後,我最希望見到啲特區投資銀行,快快手搞個實貨白銀ETF喺港交所上市。如果你哋唔搞,白銀戰隊搞!

Monday, August 20, 2007

伯南克想市跌 不過慢慢跌

孫柏文作為一個淡友,見聯儲局喺禮拜五又出手,當然好pissed off。禮拜六凌晨pissed off到喺自己個 blog度大罵特罵。點知,原來翻查自己個blog,我喺再之前嘅禮拜六,即係聯儲局第一次出手翌日,我都有大罵特罵。罵佢哋托市。

我就喺發現呢個情況之 際,突然覺悟,今日同大家分享。

其實,伯南克係想個市跌。大家冇睇錯,我再講多次,伯南克係想個市跌。

經濟學講資源分配

如果大家要知道前學者伯南克點解咁諗,就一定要墜入學者心態。所以,今日孫柏文就 幫大家補習吓啲econ,重溫吓乜嘢係「價格」。經濟學嘅神髓,就係講資源如何有效咁分配,最少資源得出最大效果。價格,對資源有效分配非常緊要。

如果價 格上升,就會吸引更多供應商去討好消費者;價格下跌,就會令供應減少,等唔會盲目生產繼而資源被浪費。伯南克一定係咁諗。

伯南克一定係諗,過去幾年,有錢 嘅人好似對風險完全唔理,令好多唔應該借到錢嘅人,借到錢,唔應該借到咁多錢嘅人,借到好多錢。點樣都好,資本錯配,浪費資源。

伯南克一定係諗,社會向 榮,資源浪費一定要停止。而可以令有錢嘅人自發地停止資本錯配,就係令「價格」下跌到應該嘅水平。市跌,即係等如價格下跌。伯南克想「價格」下跌,亦即係 想個市跌。

市跌等如價格下跌

大家可能會問:「咁佢又出手?」問得好!伯南克一定係最驚「價格」下跌超過應該嘅水平 overshoot,連冇參與有問題放債、投資活動嘅人都死埋。而喺恐慌性拋售、急速下調嘅情況之下,就最容易overshoot。

所以伯南克想個市跌, 不過慢慢跌,有秩序咁跌。

如果要手上有貨嘅人理性地拆倉,令個市慢慢跌,有班人伯南克一定要對付。呢班人,就係淡友。如果淡友參與拋空股票,贏錢,就會更大力再拋。伯南克一定覺得淡友令個跌市overshoot嘅機會大大提升,所以就喺標普500指數put輪到期計數嘅花旗國禮拜五開市之前,出手。

聽聞, 花旗國好多淡友重傷,淡友拋空帶來嘅沽壓應該減少。今日,應該裂口高開,如果伯南克真係想個市最終下跌,大家應該識點做。



Contemplating how to engineer an orderly collapse...


Sunday, August 19, 2007

原來聯儲局真係想個市跌

看到這個分析星期五聯邦儲備局的「招數」。

原來伯南克只係做 show!

"...So far in this crisis, the Fed has NOT injected one cent of liquidity into the system except for that two day bulge on Thursday and Friday August 9-10, which they completely removed by Monday and Tuesday 8/13-14...

...The fact is that the Fed remains shockingly tight in terms of the monetary base, which they have maintained at ZERO growth for the past 8 months, and LESS THAN ZERO in the past week when the sheet was hitting the fan.

Sure that can all change next week, but you wouldn’t know it from the actions they took on Friday..."


我不會再批評聯儲局「做嘢」,因為只會令人覺得他們真是在做緊嘢!

今日裂口高開,、沽、沽

Saturday, August 18, 2007

What Central Banks want...

17th of August. Friday. Fed lowered the interest rate of its discount window by 0.50%, from 6.25% to 5.75%.

The discount window is a place where banks can shove all kinds of weird and crappy assets to the Federal Reserve in order to get loans.

Notice how the discount window rate was 1% above the Fed target rate. The difference is in the Fed target rate, banks can only get that rate providing "approved" assets as collateral. While the discount window allows for all sorts of crap.

Before I say what central banks want. Lets begin with what they (supposedly) don't want.

1. They don't want to destroy the value of the currency.
2. They don't want to encourage failed practices of bad lending/investment ie. do not want to encourage moral hazard.

Now, what don't they mind...

1. They don't mind people having their equity wiped out.

Therefore, what they do want...

1. An orderly selling in order for prices to fall to a level that truly reflects the value of assets.

I was an angry man as a bear on Friday when the Fed made its move... Then I began looking into what I wrote last week...

Turns out that I was an angry man LAST FRIDAY too when the Fed stepped in to provide liquidity...

I suddenly realize, the Fed basically is hoping to do just enough to slow selling. Notice I used the word SLOW and not STOP.

Falling will proceed, perhaps like last week, when on Monday and Tuesday, equity prices barely moved after gapping up 200 pts to open on Monday.


But by Wednesday, the carnage reignited.

Also, part of the tactical reason to announce on the 17th August Friday, was because a lot of put options in the US was going to expire. By jacking up the market for Friday, a lot of bear's financial strength was weakened (mine certainly was), thereby reducing the desire and ability to further short the market. The effect will be SLOWED selling.

Falls of a couple hundred points a day for the HSI or a 100pts a day for Dow is highly acceptable to the Federal Reserve. The fed will have to see 1000pts drop on consecutive days to act again.

For all those people who says this is over. I can tell you this...

IT AIN'T over until every asset can be priced.
Then with all assets priced...

IT AIN'T over until those with no equity left is wiped out,
IT AIN'T over until banks announced their losses,
IT AIN'T over until
everyone knows where their balance sheet stands...

Then its over.

When it's over... do you think the market will be higher or lower than now?

The fed statement

This is the Fed statement concerning the 0.50% cut in the discount window rate...

"... To promote the restoration of orderly conditions in financial markets, the Federal Reserve Board approved temporary changes to its primary credit discount window facility.

The Board approved a 50 basis point reduction in the primary credit rate to 5-3/4 percent, to narrow the spread between the primary credit rate and the Federal Open Market Committee's target federal funds rate to 50 basis points.

The Board is also announcing a change to the Reserve Banks' usual practices to allow the provision of term financing for as long as 30 days, renewable by the borrower. (ie forever) These changes will remain in place until the Federal Reserve determines that market liquidity has improved materially.

These changes are designed to provide depositories with greater assurance about the cost and availability of funding. The Federal Reserve will continue to accept a broad range of collateral for discount window loans, including home mortgages and related assets. (ie we take all the crap you can shove to us for $$) Existing collateral margins will be maintained.

In taking this action, the Board approved the requests submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of New York and San Francisco..."

As I have said previously...

*sigh*

as a bear, got punched below the belt.

Well, fundamentals still with us... The trend is our friend.

Financial firms such as mortgage lender cannot securitize its mortgage to re sell and are stuck with the loans on their books.

Investment banks cannot securitize its loans to private equity funds doing M&A, and are stuck with those loans on their books.

Hedge funds/Mutual funds are facing redemption galore, and they are holding a lot of collateral which they still have to mark to market, or have no market to mark value to. They don't know how much the assets in the funds are worth!

Commercial banks with their credit lines extended to the aforementioned financial institutions are stuck.

It is a question of solvency, not liquidity... This is not Hang Seng Bank of the 60s... This is BCCI of the 90s!

Now... Why is it solvency? FALLING HOME PRICES... NO more mortgage equity withdrawals.

Nothing has changed...

-------------------------------------

An alternative view from Roubini's blog entry dated 16th of Aug

"...Friday Morning Update: The Fed just announced a 50bps cut of the discount rate from 6.25% to 5.75%.

Apart from the psychological effect - higher probability now of a Fed Funds cut rate and signal that the Fed cares about this financial turmoil - this cut of the discount rate is mostly cosmetic as very few banks access the discount window.

More importantly, the Fed extended the normal term of lending to banks from overnight to 30 days. And the FOMC statement effectively has changed the Fed policy to an easing bias. At this point a 25bps Fed Funds cut at the September meeting is almost sure; and an inter-meeting cut is possible if financial conditions deteriorate before the September meeting..."

Friday, August 17, 2007

Surreal...

補選...

From Oriental Daily.

港島補選泛民未協調先爭拗

【本報訊】民主派為爭逐因馬力病逝而騰空的立法會港島議席,將協調派人參與港島補選,但未進行協調已出現分歧,民主黨甘乃威建議泛民,決定派出誰人參選,應五成看民調,五成看黨派及地區人士的取向,而何秀蘭則即時反彈,指她所屬的公民起動並非政黨,有關建議對她不公平。

親中陣營以外有意參加港島補選的人愈來愈多,除何秀蘭率先表態參選,社民連表明必「參與其中」外,有傳曾參加港島直選的金融時事評論員孫柏文亦有意加入混戰。民主黨方面,由於有兩名黨員甘乃威及馮煒光均希望參加港島補選,昨晚召開中常委擴大會議,通過考慮支部、中委及會員大會三方面意見,決定人選,望九月上旬完成後再根據民調與工作表現,與其他有意參與人士協調。

甘乃威何秀蘭先禮後兵

同是中西區區議員的甘乃威及何秀蘭,昨日同場出席一個公開活動時握手「示好」,先禮後兵。

甘乃威表示,泛民協調由誰人參加補選,除看反映候選人支持度的民調結果外,也要看地區人士與不同黨派的取態,兩者的比例應作五五之比。

其後,記者問何秀蘭是否支持有關建議,她即反對,指民調計分須綜合多個樣本計算。

-------------------------------------

From The Sun.

港島補選民主派現分歧

【本報訊】民主派為爭逐因馬力病逝而騰空的立法會港島議席,將協調派人參與港島補選,但未進行協調已出現分歧,民主黨甘乃威建議泛民,決定派出誰人參選, 應五成看民調,五成看黨派及地區人士的取向,而何秀蘭則即時反彈,指她所屬的公民起動並非政黨,有關建議對她不公平。除何秀蘭、社民連表明參選外,傳曾參 加港島直選的金融時事評論員孫柏文亦有意加入。

泡沫爆破後 坐監大熱門

1999年,科技股泡沫膨脹之際,如果你問我泡沫爆破之後邊個會出事,真係諗都諗唔到做能源嘅Enron會倒閉,做會計嘅Arthur Andersen會執笠。以上兩間公司係咪抵死,相信大家心中都有自己嘅結論,不過科技股泡沫爆破死得最無厘頭嘅,肯定係教人煮餸嘅Martha Stewart居然要鋃鐺入獄。

當時,Martha買咗少少研究抗癌藥物叫Imclone公司嘅股票。咁Imclone有隻好勁嘅抗癌藥叫Erbitux,不過隻藥勁都好,花旗國食物及藥物管理局就突然阻撓隻藥嘅認可過程,令隻藥可以賣出街嘅時間被延誤。

管理局出決定之後嗰日,孫柏文記得連《華爾街日報》嘅社論都大肆批評管理局「害死」啲需要呢隻藥嘅病人。

Martha 出事嘅原因,就係佢喺管理局出決定之前,突然放晒啲Imclone股票。因為Martha之前同Imclone總裁拍拖,所以就涉嫌用內幕消息交易。政府 查咗好耐,一路都冇證據證明Martha做錯,不過因為Martha「走得快、唔使蝕」,所以政府面對花旗國股民群情洶湧要求「交人祭旗」嘅訴求,最後就 屈咗Martha幾條「不合作」嘅罪。

落重注買Countrywide CEO

花旗國就係咁,好多時啲人變成暴徒,政府裏面嘅檢察官面對龐大壓力,就算你冇做錯,都會被拉坐監。

噚 日,花旗國最大嘅按揭中介公司Countrywide Financial,卒之宣佈會動用所有之前講到好大嘅credit line,攞現金。股價當然應聲下挫。如果叫我買,喺呢個風暴當中最會好似Martha咁,就算冇證據證明做錯,都要坐監嘅人,我一定落重注 Countrywide行政總裁Mozilo。佢年頭至今,一路都賣手上嘅Countrywide股票,而股價就由1月45元跌到噚日嘅18元,佢「走得 快、唔使蝕」,就應該會變成暴徒嘅標靶。

都唔知要救邊個

最後,噚日同Rapiere傾偈,佢要我解釋究竟金融市場發生乜事, 點解花旗國出事,特區、歐洲都大跌市。我話基本上最大問題,係市場唔知道邊個有份承擔風險,想救都唔知救邊個。Rapiere慨嘆,中央銀行已經成為當年 喺越南嘅美軍一樣,有更多嘅子彈,都唔知射乜同射邊度。

Thursday, August 16, 2007

馬力港島區議席的補選

This is from Today's SCMP by a good and fair man Ambrose Leung...I will address this by-election in a few hours time.

About my 2000 election walloping... I was 23. Who hasn't been young before?
= )

Anyhow, I do seek your advice. All of you. Please help me marshal my thoughts.

--------------------------------

Pan-democrats fear free-market candidate could split their vote

The possible entry of a radical free-market advocate in a Legislative Council by-election for Hong Kong Island could take votes from the pan-democrats, who hope to jointly field a candidate to oppose their Beijing-loyalist rivals.

Sources in the pan-democratic camp said Andrew Shuen Pak-man, a financial columnist and a founder of the Lion Rock Institute think-tank, was planning to contest the seat left vacant by Ma Lik, the former chairman of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, who died last week after suffering from colon cancer.

Mr Shuen said yesterday he would not rule out standing.

He claimed that if any free-market democrat joined the race, they would take more votes from former security chief Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee, the expected candidate of the Beijing loyalists, rather than pan-democrat Cyd Ho Sau-lan.

There is no voice in Legco in support of a truly free-market democracy, and the eight months in office for the winner can be a probationary period to see whether the public wants such a voice, Mr Shuen said.

But pan-democrats were concerned that a maverick candidate might split their vote, handing a victory to the pro-Beijing camp.

Shuen might take up a critical share of our votes and present the seat to Regina Ip, a pan-democrat campaigner said.

Lee Wing-tat, of the Democratic Party, said other candidates were unavoidable, while Ronny Tong Ka-wah of the Civic Party hoped a free-market advocate would not affect the game plan.

Mr Shuen suffered a humiliating defeat when he contested the Legco election for Hong Kong Island in 2000, receiving only 1,132 votes or 0.43 per cent of ballots cast.

Mr Shuen's Lion Rock group has been a fierce critic of social welfare and high taxation and opposed state intervention in labour disputes.

The picture of me that SCMP selected.

呢場信貸風暴叫Katrina

對上幾日,孫柏文同大家一樣,都覺得特區股市好似入咗風眼,喺暴風中突然一片平 靜。不過到噚日,特區股市裂口低開後繼續跌,成交量比起前日升四、五成。

不過講真,打風對於我呢代特區人嚟講係一個情意結。由細細個開始,每次未做完功課 瞓覺時,都希望第二朝起身時懸掛八號風球,就算出嚟做嘢都一樣。我有個朋友叫Jessica Ng,上個禮拜四颱風「帕布」啱啱襲港時,佢有好多同事滿肚密圈約定麻雀腳,等禮拜五放假。

點知禮拜五發現颱風已經掠過特區以南海面,個個諗住打牌嘅朋 友,全部落空、齊齊返工,佢嘅同事成朝痛罵呢個颱風。唔知係咪啲罵罵聲觸怒咗天神,所以到下晝「帕布」嚟咗個澳門髮夾灣式U turn,再次襲港,天文台掛上八號風球,下晝股市都要停。

因結構性問題被淹沒

今日同大家分享Jessica嘅故事,應該係典型港人喺打風下嘅經驗,無驚無險,打完天朗氣清。不過作為一個前石油分析員,孫柏文絕 對明白打風可以幾恐怖。

2005年8月29日,颱風Katrina打中花旗國新奧爾良,打完確實天朗氣清,不過都差唔多兩年之後嘅今日,新奧爾良好多地方 仲係一池死水、頹垣敗瓦,人口得打風前嘅六成。

今日呢場風暴,就有如當年嘅Katrina,一眾投資銀行、金融機構就係新奧爾良,唔打風就歌舞昇平,不過 遇上「完美風暴」,就會因結構性問題被淹沒。打完風嘅天朗氣清,只會令人睇清楚地上嘅人間煉獄。各位喺投資銀行打工嘅fan屎,有心理準備可能要永遠離開 你哋嘅新奧爾良。

Wednesday, August 15, 2007

高盛攬上身 最後骨牌已放好

噚日,特區股市成交量進一步下跌,得嗰500幾億。股市感覺上,好似噚日我講過咁,繼續喺風眼中。

不過孫柏文覺 得,喺呢個可以唞唞嘅時間,不如退一步以宏觀角度睇睇呢場信貸風暴。又或者從另一個角度睇,呢場風暴係點形成。以下就係番鬼佬一個比較玄,關於周期嘅睇法,我想多謝網友「暗黑的卡夫卡」、「zombie」同利世民幫手繙譯。

奴役中得到啓發,
啓發後產生勇氣,
憑勇氣爭取自由,
自由孕育出豐裕,
豐裕腐化成自滿,
自滿養成了苟且,
苟且淪落為依賴政府,
而依賴中者恒被奴役。

一有事玉石俱焚

呢場信貸風暴,原先係因融資市場發現資金流向可以更 有效,所以發明新嘅財技去達致社會向榮嘅目的。點知,走火入魔,誕生咗股神畢菲特所謂嘅「金融大殺傷力武器」,如果用以上番鬼佬周期嘅分析,今次信貸危機 已經到達「苟且淪落為依賴政府」嘅階段。

當然,金融業當中有人想力挽狂瀾,而當中表表者,一定係投資銀行高盛Goldman Sachs。好多銀行都有管理投資基金,而大家亦見到好多呢啲基金,因為沾手次按債券及其衍生工具,又或者投資其他嘢不過做太多孖展所以爆煲。不過爆煲唔 等如一定會製造危機,基金爆煲之後管理嘅銀行點處理,對大圍投資者信心非常重要。

1.上月初Bear Stearns基金出事,注資16億美元,跟住話因太多投資者贖回,最後基金執笠。借錢畀基金做孖展嘅金融機構人人自危,危機唔擴散先奇。你做其他金融機 構嘅股東,唔好話唔驚。

2.上個禮拜BNP Paribas基金出事,原先出嚟話冇事,點知14日後就將基金變成曱甴酒店。喺投資者突然發現有入冇出嘅情況下,如果你有買基金,有冇考慮贖回?

3.Goldman基金前日出事,銀行注資20億美元,攞明姿態如果繼續有事,就會玉石俱焚,呢一招標示高盛精英嘅信心。不過如果問我,高盛今次押重注入 股,將基金攬上身,就有如推骨牌遊戲當中,放下最後一塊骨牌。一推就…


Tuesday, August 14, 2007

玩Yoga? 介紹專家畀你

噚日,孫柏文睇我報報道有示威,抗議有間Yoga中心「改名換姓」取消課程。報道隔籬有 幅相,裏面啲英文好似有啲錯,不過作為一個日日被人抨擊中文差嘅番書仔,最緊要明就得。

見幅相有錯處,我就反射式咁開始玩「尋錯處」遊戲。睇清楚啲,見到 有位立法會議員一齊去示威,涉嫌抽油水。

平時見到立法會議員參加討伐私人錢債衝突嘅示威,我都覺得關佢咩事?關政府咩事?又出嚟抽油水?不過今次抗議 Yoga中心就唔同,因為有份參與嘅立法會議員係劉江華。

大家都知道Yoga玩到登峯造極嘅時候,一定係軟骨功練到爐火純青。劉江華作為一個既係民主黨前 身港同盟嘅成員,亦係今時今日民建聯嘅中堅分子,孫柏文絕對相信,劉江華唔係要求退回學費,以佢嘅功力,應該係要求發還被拖欠嘅薪金。祝佢好運!

股市「風眼中的平靜」

噚日,特區股市成交量得嗰600幾億,比平時有如用水瓜打狗一樣,少咁截。冇辦法,大家都驚做出頭鳥。上個禮拜,歐洲同花旗國打金融風暴,以前好景時,啲 銀行就好似大賊一樣,個個稱兄道弟,互相承認對方資產嘅價值,你借錢畀我、我借錢畀你。點知一打風,個個反轉豬肚就係……互不承認對方資產嘅價值,大大力 向各方抽走資金。

如果金融體系係一個生命體,錢,就係血。血喺個生命體停止流動時,就有如心臟病發。各國中央銀行,就好似緊急醫護人員面對啲O.D.咗嘅 raver一樣,一支腎上腺素咁打入個心臟,突然令啲raver睇落去好似冇事。大家要知道,設計上支腎上腺素只可以幫三日,三日之後就消散,照理應該繼 續出事。不過,作為白銀戰隊隊長,孫柏文當然唔會排除日日打支腎上腺素入心臟嘅可能性。

不過大家要知道,如果真係日日打,咁我叫大家「一注獨贏買白銀」嘅120美元一盎斯目標價,就肯定唔需要去到我原先嘅2016年限期至靈驗。大家就當腎上腺素發作嘅呢幾日,好似冇乜事嘅時刻,為風眼中嘅平靜。

Monday, August 13, 2007

信貸危機快覽 今日個市點炒

信貸危機一出,爆發好多怪現象。首先有白銀,禮拜四「因次按影響大跌」,有其他傳媒條題係咁寫。跟住禮拜五又「因次按影響大升」,條題又真係咁寫。大跌因次按,大升又因次按,咁點先?仲有禮拜五,一向動盪中「避風塘」嘅真貨AAA評級債券,居然面對龐大沽壓。難明,更難做買賣。

今日,孫柏文係想解釋以上怪現象,不過解釋之前,我想大家知道花旗集團Citigroup呢幾個星期,喺信貸業務輸咗7億美元。仲要係同按揭、地產完全無關。7億?喺邊度聽過呢?咪就係滙豐出中期業績,走出嚟話自己為花旗國按揭業務嘅撥備金額。即係話,今次花旗集團輸錢消息,又會令好多叫我做「明燈」嘅人,走出嚟大手、大手買Citigroup。勁!

切記港股流通量大


大家要記得,今次呢個浪嘅源頭係因喺8月1日,法國BNP話自己管理嘅投資基金冇事。不過事隔冇兩個禮拜,就唔畀人贖回,基金變曱甴酒店,有入冇出。BNP8月1日話冇事,遲過HSBC出中期業績7月30日話冇事,唔知HSBC 點呢?

入正題。真貨AAA債券面對龐大沽壓,就係因有好多對冲基金,被人贖回,基金需要現金畀番啲客。不過手頭上嘅「怪誕」債券冇成交,唯一賣出流通量大嘅真貨AAA債券。用基本分析,又點解釋以上嘅現象?已到估人,而唔係分析市嘅地步。你估唔估到?咁你又做買賣?記得,特區股市流通量好大。

最後,白銀確實喺禮拜四「因次按影響大跌」,理由係銀行與銀行之間,因唔知大家有幾大鑊,所以突然抽水,令現金價值急升,所有資產價值下跌。到禮拜五,白銀又確實喺「因次按影響大升」,理由係各國中央銀行眼見「唔夠水」,所以大放特放「止痛水」。

雖然話3日後要還,不過如果日日都放,市場仲唔覺得中央銀行就算摧毀貨幣價值,都要救啲銀行,喺呢個情況之下白銀仲唔升?已到估伯南克放幾多水,而唔係睇基本因素嘅地步。你估唔估到?咁你又做買賣?





Can u translate this?

I am looking for someone to translate this eloquently into Chinese...

From bondage to spiritual faith
From spiritual faith to great courage
From great courage to liberty
From liberty to abundance
From abundance to complacency
From complacency to apathy
From apathy to government dependence
From government dependency to bondage

Please feel free to translate this in "comments"

Would publish the best entry on Tuesday = )

Roubini's verdict - this is worse than LTCM

This is one of the most eloquent explanation why this crisis feels different to 1998 LTCM crisis.

Let's admit it. Despite the then graduating class of BBA's at UofM complaining "it is the worst market for graduates since 1994", it was far quicker than one thought.

Of course, it happened during the depth of the Asian Financial Crisis.

Anyhow, difference between LTCM and now.

Illiquid vs Insolvent.

Asians were insolvent. American financial institutions were merely illiquid. Then.

Saturday, August 11, 2007

A Run on Wall Street Finance

From Doug Noland... Want a thorough rundown of today's crisis? Read and weep...

------------------------------

A Run on Wall Street Finance

The week commenced with the fanciful notion that increased purchases by the GSEs would suffice to re-liquefy the U.S. mortgage marketplace. The NYSE Financial Index proceeded to rally 7% before reality began to return Wednesday afternoon. A tumultuous week of faltering international Credit markets ended with the major global central banks injecting liquidity to the tune of $140bn, including Federal Reserve mortgage-backed securities purchases of $38bn. This afternoon it was reported that Fannie Mae sought permission for asset growth of “a moderate increase in the range of 10 percent” – a $70bn or so drop in the bucket.


The GSEs will certainly not be bailing out the global Credit system. Instead, the question has become how successful global central bankers will be in restoring confidence in a system that so has so abruptly begun coming apart at the seams. At this point, I will assume that global central bankers have come to accept that only their aggressive interventions offer the hope of a liquidity backstop sufficient to bolster fading confidence and stem a modern-day Run on “Wall Street Finance.”


The Risk Market Contagion that erupted in U.S. subprime mortgages has now fully engulfed the heart of “structured finance” – the CDO marketplace, asset-backed securities, the “repo” market, Credit derivatives, “structured products,” and even the perceived pristine “money” market fund complex. The cover story from today’s Financial Times (see above) quoted Marc Ostwald, fixed income strategist at Insinger de Beaufort: “There is huge pressure on money rates due to an apparent sense of mistrust. Following BNP Paribas’ statement, very few institutions appear willing to lend. If you kill off the inter-bank market and the asset- backed commercial paper market has effectively collapsed, then we look to be heading for a serious liquidity crunch.”


Central banks do retain significant potential firepower to buttress marketplace liquidity in the near-term. Yet the ongoing impact such interventions will have in restoring trust in market pricing, securities ratings, sophisticated model-based trading strategies, counterparty risk, general risk management capabilities and liquidity in Wall Street’s newfangled “structured” products is very much an open question. It is my view that some Crucial Financial Myths have been Thoroughly Shattered.


I have often addressed the notion of the “Moneyness of Credit” – in particular, the vital role played by what had been the prevailing Credit market perception that myriad debt instruments are both a store of nominal value (“safe”) and readily marketable (“liquid”). In general, a market’s belief that Credit is as attractive as “money” plays a decisive role in fostering Credit expansion. Over time, as the perception of moneyness is applied to expanding types and quantities of Credit instruments, a full-fledged Credit Bubble will take hold. And, as we’ve witnessed, the longer Credit excesses inflate asset prices, corporate earnings, and household incomes - the more seductive the Myth that the underlying Credit instruments are increasingly safe and liquid.


It takes years (decades?) and, importantly, the successful perseverance through at least a few close calls, for the perception of Moneyness to become fully embedded in the structure of the Credit system. Emboldened market participants eventually come to believe that that nothing can interrupt the boom. Each near crisis surmounted leads to only greater confidence in the underlying Credit system and the capacity for the authorities to sustain the boom - each period of greater excess layering more dangerous layers of risk on top of risk.


Last week I discussed the previous (unsung) hero role the GSEs played in multiple near financial crises going back to 1994. Whether they acted in concert or not, timely Fed rate cuts coupled with huge GSE market purchase operations provided an epic market support mechanism throughout a period of unprecedented Wall Street innovation and enlargement. The powerful process of expanding Moneyness of Wall Street Credit is beholden to the Fed and GSEs.


Importantly, over time the market perceived that liquidity could be taken for granted under virtually all circumstances. Clearly, any “AAA” security would remain highly liquid – even during those occasional (and brief) bouts of market turbulence. “Triple A” came to mean “money” – an instrument that would always entice a buyer at a fair market price. Better yet, often such instruments even increased in value during market tumult. It certainly didn’t hurt that GSE debt dominated the entire “AAA” market – their short- and long-term debt instruments as well as agency MBS equipped with their guarantees. And as the leveraged speculators repeatedly took full advantage – certainly in 1994, 1998, 1999 and 2000 - the GSEs were more than happy to pay top dollar or more for MBS, mortgages, and other debt instruments any time the markets lurched toward de-leveraging and illiquidity.


Administrations, Congresses, and the Fed took no issue with the marketplace’s implied government backing of GSE debt, allowing the GSEs for years to luxuriate in their unlimited access to market-based borrowings. Indeed, GSE debt enjoyed the extraordinary status of being completely immune to market liquidity concerns. The GSEs could borrow as much as they wanted – especially during periods of market tumult – and buy as much MBS and as many debt instruments in the marketplace as they (and the market!) desired. I can't stress too strongly how this profoundly distorted the markets’ perception of pricing and liquidity risk for agency debt as well as for the markets overall - and for years nurtured today's unfolding financial crisis.


But why do I this evening insist on rehashing the sordid history of GSE/Fed market interventions? Well, I think they played the key role in the market’s momentous misperception that “AAA” stood for “Always And Anytime liquid.” For a decade GSE-related debt instruments dominated “AAA” and anything associated with the GSEs was always highly-liquid in even the most adverse market conditions. And this liquidity had very much to do with the extraordinary mechanism whereby, during periods of financial stress, eager buyers of GSE debt (especially foreign buyers) would provide the GSEs unlimited wherewithal to provide a Liquidity Backstop in MBS, mortgage, and mortgage company debt instruments.


Not only were the GSEs not susceptible to “Ponzi Finance” dynamics, these strange government-sponsored market operators evolved into the Anti-Ponzi. Whenever market confidence began to wane, “money” flooded into the GSEs and right out to the increasingly speculative markets – and everyone enjoyed robust returns provided by an unparalleled and seemingly endless liquidity-generating machine. And, let there be no doubt, the sophisticated leveraged speculating community took complete advantage of the extraordinary liquidity backdrop. I really believe that if there was no extended GSE boom – there would have been no Mortgage Finance Bubble – no Wall Street Bubble – no derivatives Bubble – and no protracted economic consumption-based U.S. economic boom.


Well, the world of finance subtly changed with the revelation of the GSEs’ (inevitable) abuse of Phenomenal Financial Power. Issuance of GSE debt and Agency MBS stalled abruptly in 2004. Yet at that point Mortgage Finance Bubble Dynamics were in full force. After all, Inflationary Biases had taken firm hold in real estate markets across the country and throughout the Wall Street mortgage finance machinery. Indeed, the Street didn’t miss a beat with the hamstrung GSEs. The evolution of market perceptions of Moneyness to include ALL mortgage-related securities encouraged an historic issuance boom in “private-label” MBS and ABS (see charts above). Wall Street was quite keen to more than fill the GSE void with its own brand of top-rated "structured finance." And flood it they did.


Soon there were Bubbling markets for ARMs, jumbo, Alt-A, “teaser”, “exotic” and scores of subprime mortgages – the majority finding homes in the mushrooming market for Wall Street CDOs and other “structured products.” A protracted mortgage boom and inflated home prices created a history of minimal Credit losses, emboldening those rating mortgage-related securities as well as those happy to take leveraged positions in these instruments (including the proliferation of hedge funds, mortgage REITs, Wall Street trading proprietary trading operations, etc.). While the GSEs were left to spend billions sorting through their accounting mess, the various Bubbles they were instrumental in nurturing grew to unfathomable dimensions. Never in history were so many “AAA” (and “AA”) securities being created, many sliced and diced from less than money-like mortgages. This mortgage debt explosion dispersed “top-rated” U.S. debt securities throughout the U.S. and global financial systems.


Returning back to the subtle change beginning back in 2004, the character of risk associated with new MBS issuance changed markedly. While the “AAA” status remained constant, the non-GSE “private-label” variety of MBS/ABS were associated with increasingly risky underlying mortgages. The insatiable appetite for these relatively higher-yielding securities to satisfy the booming demand for CDOs and other structured products was sufficient to deaden any market sensitivity to the reality that the GSE “backstop bid” had been slammed shut. GSE balance sheets were no longer in a position to balloon on demand. Besides, most of these “private-label” securities were not within the charter of GSE purchases anyways. The marketplace might have been conditioned to believe liquidity risk had not changed – but it had and profoundly.


From the spectacular subprime implosion to this week’s rapidly unfolding global liquidity crisis, a clearer picture is emerging: It’s one of a momentous reversal in the liquidity backdrop from GSE-induced Anti-Ponzi to the Acute Financial Fragility associated with Minskian Ponzi Finance. No longer does a reversal in speculator leverage conveniently flow onto GSE balance sheets, setting the stage (with Fed rate cuts) for an only more egregious expansion of Credit and speculative excess. Instead, de-leveraging these days has quickly incited contagious marketplace illiquidity and a highly disruptive reversal of speculative flows from mortgage-related instruments, along with the very real risk of a mortgage Credit collapse.


It is popular to explain market gyrations as “re-pricing” of risk. Other comments suggest that this is only a “short-term Credit crunch” and that “this is a liquidity issue not a solvency issue.” This is much, much more serious. Key facets of “contemporary finance” are on the line. The entire process of Wall Street Credit and Risk Intermediation is today in jeopardy.


There are today literally Trillions of dollars of impaired debt instruments – previously “top-rated” securities that will never live up to their (fallacious) billing. And after a spectacular multi-year issuance boom, they are everywhere - especially in places appropriate for only the most “money-like” safe and liquid instruments. The perceived safest and most liquid securities found homes in various types of “money market” funds and other perceived low-risk investment vehicles. The perceived safest and most liquid instruments were fodder for the greatest abuses of leverage. The bottom line is that these securities were misconceived as “money-like” from day one, and the marketplace has shifted to the recognition that they are instead risky and inappropriate for most investment vehicles and for leveraging. This radical change in market percepts is wreaking bloody havoc on the untested Credit derivatives marketplace.


Global central banks can somewhat cushion the de-leveraging process, but I doubt they can do much more than slow the flight from risky Credit instruments and “investment” vehicles. Importantly, perilous market misperceptions with respect to risk and liquidity have been exposed. Speculative de-leveraging is unmasking serious flaws in various assumptions (including liquidity and market correlations) used by “black box” models in leveraged strategies across various securities markets. The bloom is off the rose and a tidal wave of hedge fund withdrawals – and further de-leveraging - cannot be ruled out.


The major international banks have been key players in U.S. structured finance, especially in money market “conduits,” “funding corps,” and “special purpose vehicles.” This might very well be the epicenter of the current liquidity crisis, and they will surely vow to avoid such exposure to U.S. Credit risk going forward. The highly leveraged Wall Street firms will struggle to rein in risk on myriad fronts and likely be forced to fight mightily for survival. And for how long the American public can hold its nerve is a major question. They have been conditioned to believe that their holdings in the stock, bond, and “money” market are safe and secure. And the longer central bank interventions sustain unsustainably inflated asset markets, the greater the opportunity for the speculator community to “distribute” their holdings to the unsuspecting public.


As much as I recognize the traditional role of central banks as liquidity providers of last resort, I just sense that being forced to move this early – with global stock markets at near record highs – provides confirmation of the Acute Fragility of the global Credit system. Such moves would appear to risk further destabilizing already highly unstable global markets, especially currency markets. This does look to me as a Run on Wall Street Finance – and an absolute mess.

The hypocrisy of Western World Finance

HYPOCRISY.


When there is a financial crisis in Europe and American, it is all "Save them! Save them! Or else there will be SYSTEMIC RISKS!!!"

When there is a financial crisis in Asia and Mexico, it is all "Let them die, Let them die, Or else there will be MORAL HAZARD!!!"

Hypocrites.

Hypocrites imbued with hubris.This is Vengeance...



Friday, August 10, 2007

A truly impartial piece, a great read!

I was unaware of this particular blog entry.

But I would like to share it with you.

I strongly recommend you (if you fit the profile) to follow through with her advice when you see me, 孫柏文.

Credit crunch caused by margin calls...

Banks and financial institutions are margin calling each other...

And what did I say just a few short days ago?

Mark those subprime derivatives to Market...

According to the WSJ (subscription required)... The SEC is checking the books at Wall Street firms, including Goldman, Bear Stearns and Merrill, to make sure they aren't hiding subprime-mortgage losses.

Mark to MARKET SUCKAS!!! hahahahhaha

Oh wait... no buy bids... no market... ooops.

Also, when a financial crisis sweeps into Europe and the US, everyone is running around screaming, "Save them! Save them! Or we risk systemic risks!"

When a financial crisis sweeps into Asia or Mexico, everyone is running around screaming, "Let them die! Let them die! Or we risk moral hazard!"

Yes... I hold a grudge. Ask an Indonesian when he watches a video of World Bank officials talking about how they dealt with the Asian Financial Crisis... The official said, "ah well, there are places we could have done better..."

No Shit.

Diffusion no Solution to Convulsion

聯儲局前主席格林斯潘,作為花旗國中央銀行行長,除咗話自己要保護美元購買力之外,就係要避免有金融體制「返枱式」嘅動盪systemic risk。每次有危機,都係因有啲機構,或者一類機構,好似孫柏文咁「一注獨贏」,負上太多風險,跟住走勢逆轉,繼而爆煲,牽連市場。


有見及此,格林斯潘當年話好開心見到好多新興財技,例如將按揭變成可以買賣嘅債券securitization,令風險冇需要聚集喺一個地方。

越大越積聚重金屬

講 環保。大家都知道,究竟一樣嘢係咪「毒」,取決於濃度,山埃只要加入足夠嘅水,都會冇害。以前花旗國人將邏輯伸延,決定解決污染嘅最好方法,就係盡量將污 染物溝稀、冲淡。排污入個魚塘就唔得,不過排入汪洋大海就ok。

呢個政策,邏輯上絕對冇問題,不過久而久之,噩夢開始發生。冇錯,攞海水嚟驗,啲海水係冇 問題,不過海裏面嘅小魚兒,開始進食帶有微量例如重金屬污染物嘅海洋植物。小魚兒又被大魚食,而大魚又被更大嘅魚…科學家分析食物鏈當中各級動物時,就開 始發現海洋動物越大,身體積聚重金屬嘅濃度,亦都越高。

禍及金融業重磅企業

「溝稀解決污染」dilution is the solution to pollution,確實係將細範圍嘅災難性污染解決,將污染稀釋至全世界。不過,後果就係全世界各地都有海洋中最重磅嘅動物──鯨魚,因為身體重金屬濃 度過高而死亡。講番財經。

今時今日,大家見到世界各地都有啲金融業中最重磅動物,相繼出事。原來,用財技分散風險,同溝稀嚟解決污染,後果都係一樣。孫柏文只可以話句:「Diffusion is no solution to convulsion」。

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Would like to thank Eugene Linden for this piece = )

"...at least one very large hedge fund or investment bank is liquidating "massive" trading portfolios..."

From Marketwatch.com...

"...Black Mesa Capital, a hedge-fund firm that uses computer models to track down investment ideas, said that at least one large hedge fund or investment bank is liquidating "massive" trading portfolios, according to a letter the Santa Fe, N.M.-based firm sent to investors Wednesday..."

Also, rumours of bank runs abound in Europe.

Perhaps, when those two events come together.

1. Some one is getting some real ass margin calls.
2. Explains why both the ECB and FED is injecting MASSIVE liquidity.

Something bad is hitting the fan right now.

Thursday, August 09, 2007

補選在即 選這議員吧!

立 法會議員馬力昨日因癌病去世。死者已矣,《蘋果批》不欲再為他的生平事迹作出評論。務實一點,現在應該向前看,對香港社會來說,馬力的去世,所帶來最迫切 的事情,自然是他的港島區立法會議席,需要補選。

當然,每個市民心中,都有一個理想人選,去代替馬力,成為立法會議員。這刻,《蘋果批》希望見到的,會是 個怎樣的立法會議員?

《蘋果批》希望見到的,是為了在私立幼稚園讀書的小朋友的家長,爭取學券伸延至私立幼稚園的議員。雖然有關幼稚園的學費,可能比幼稚 園學券規定的上限為高,甚至是父母的重擔,但家長都依然讓小朋友入讀,原因是,私立幼稚園在營運上有自由,能夠釋放出教師的潛能,令到這間私立幼稚園的教 師,用心教導他們的小朋友,為栽培他們成材打好基礎。

不僅如此,《蘋果批》還希望見到的,是那位議員為不斷成長的小朋友,繼續向政府爭取中小學學券,打破 生硬的教育制度,釋放出教師的潛能,最終令我們的下一代得益。

《蘋果批》希望見到有議員走出來說,為管理費用高昂的強積金制度,全面引入競爭,讓市民自行 決定續供強積金與否。退休生活,如何達到,各自有其打算,但政府強迫市民將收入的一部份,放入管理費用昂貴的強積金制度之中,最終蠶食香港市民辛辛苦苦賺 取的血汗錢。

要解決管理費用過高的唯一方法,是全面引入退休選擇競爭,願意繼續供款的市民,當然可以繼續享用現有制度;想將命運掌握在手中的市民,則可以 即時停供強積金,並可取回現有供款,可以將資金用在例如小朋友教育之上,不再強迫市民供款予積金公司。

讓積金公司明白到,無法再利用政府強迫市民供款來牟 取暴利,不降低管理費用,最終必定遭到市場淘汰。要求為強積金全面引入競爭的最終原因,是《蘋果批》不想見到強積金危害香港人的退休生活,到未來退休時, 因強積金政策而令香港人的退休生活水平降低。

《蘋果批》亦希望見到有議員反對訂立最低工資、最高工時等勞工法例,這類法例好心做壞事,令低技術工人難入 職、難轉行、難重投勞工市場,害了年輕人、新移民,和選擇生育的婦女。

最後,《蘋果批》當然希望那位議員,對民主訴求堅定。

以上,都是《蘋果批》希望見到 的自由市場民主議員,他在那裏?

債王測減息 甚麼又爆升

噚日,特區股市嘅恒指升628點,「路易發」意頭唔錯。

如果大家問孫柏文點解升咁 多,答案好簡單。上個禮拜五,花旗國標普五百跌39點(2.6%),跌穿200日平均線,特區禮拜一就被拖累,跌602點(2.7%)。

不過禮拜一,標普 五百升番34點,差唔多完全收復失地,特區禮拜二個市都冇反彈。要去到噚日禮拜三先至有反應。最弊就係呢排升升跌跌都係成交量少,噚日個市簡直好似我坐喺 桑拿房時嘅血壓一樣,乾升。相信大家同我一樣,都係等緊睇吓花旗國仲有冇嘢要爆。

等,無奈咁等。

白銀仲唔爆升?

我早幾日都一路講,關於花旗國債市出現嘅信貸斷層問題,《金手指》一欄,好少會direct quote。孫柏文推 銷概念畀大家嘅時候,好少會話:「呢個概念邊個邊個專家講嘅。」因為我覺得如過要話「邊個邊個講」,大家先服,個概念嘅說服力肯定好低。又或者掉轉嚟諗, 大家如果聽到一個由我講出嚟嘅概念,都覺得合情合理,個概念嘅說服力就肯定好高。不過,今日就要破例一次。

記得早排,高盛「投降」,由原先話「今年聯儲局 減息三次,減0.75%」,變成「今年唔減息」時,有債王Bond King之稱嘅PIMCO Bill Gross,一於好少理,企硬話聯儲局今年一定減息。當時佢話過,如果淨係睇數據,係應該唔減息。聯儲局唯一會減息嘅情況,就係如果有危機。當時佢企硬, 大家都應該知道佢對危機可以發生嘅機會率點睇。

噚日,Bill Gross又重申相信喺幾個月之內,聯儲局會開始減息。大家可以覺得冇信貸危機,可以同我對賭,不過要知道,都係同債王對賭。

最後,我想引述Jim Rogers,佢話:「成立聯儲局嘅原因,唔係去拯救華爾街。成立聯儲局嘅原因,係去捍衞貨幣購買力。希望佢哋真係會咁做。」伸延呢個邏輯,即係減息等如 放棄保護美元購買力,白銀仲唔爆升?

後記:立法會議員馬力去世,孫柏文今日喺A24論壇版嘅《蘋果批》會談及我對議席補選有乜希望。

Wednesday, August 08, 2007

讓「次按拖累」一詞壽終正寢吧!

今日,孫柏文希望所有傳媒工作者,如果見到花旗國股市因為信貸危機大跌,唔好再反 射式用「次按拖累」一詞去解釋。次按危機,本身係因為市場資金氾濫,又遇上無畏無懼嘅投機者,所以令到好多唔應該借錢嘅人,或者唔應該借咁多錢嘅人,可以 借錢投機。到投機嘅資產大幅貶值時,就會出現好多人唔還錢,債主中招危機。

問題已蔓延開去

除咗花旗國樓市之外,基本上所有信 貸市場都出現同一情況。2月嗰次大跌市,就係「次按拖累」,不過今次嘅跌市,就算淨係睇花旗國按揭,已經蔓延至其他「比較安全」嘅按揭。

毋須要入息證明, 原先係畀嗰啲高收入,不過收入飄忽嘅人士(例如律師、Sales)嘅Alt-A另類優質貸款,都出事。

就連借畀啲薪高糧準人士(例如公務員)嘅prime 優質貸款,欠款比率亦升。最弊嘅係,問題冇咁簡單。

拖累因信貸危機

呢幾年,令資金氾濫嘅財技,非常倚賴風險評級公司,例如標 普嘅信貸風險評級,有好高嘅公信度。不過因為連AAA級次按債券都出事,所以今時今日係一個「信貸危機」,唔係「次按危機」咁簡單。

就算一個想買債券,手 頭上又有好多資金嘅人,因為唔知到呢個AAA級係堅,定係次按嗰隻,所以根本唔會去買。所以喺可見嘅未來,若有金融機構出事,令市場大跌,各位同行,唔好 再用「次按拖累」去解釋,應該用「信貸危機拖累」啦!

Bears Stearns點解要去開曼群島清對冲基金盤?

Bears Stearns管理嘅對冲基金點解要去開曼群島清盤,而唔係留喺花旗國?因為想債權人難以充公資產。

點解要債權人難攞啲?因為如果債權人攞咗對冲基金啲資 產拍賣,而賣價好差,Bears Stearns又成手嗰啲貨,Bears Stearns分分鐘資不抵債。

最好就係冇人知值幾錢,Bears Stearns話值幾多就幾多。

會考成績炒咗?

孫柏文有個女性後輩,係今屆會考生,屋企有錢,老竇有錢有如李國章,仲要個樣有幾分姿 色,平時讀書品學兼優。不過佢母親唔肯送佢去外國讀番書,原因係怕佢「貞節不保」,就算佢同媽媽解釋,留喺特區都可以……阿媽都好似話冇談判餘地,就連解 釋話特區冇佢想讀嘅科目,阿媽都企硬。

不過今日我想恭喜佢,因為佢「涉嫌造馬」,今次會考應該凶多吉少。如果佢冇計算錯誤,父母冇得揀之下,都要送佢去外 國讀書。佢亦終於可以如願以償。

不過如果你老竇唔係李國章,今日成績又炒咗,實不相瞞,today is going to be a real shitty day。不過我想同你講,孫柏文完全知道你呢刻嘅感受,因為我都曾經試過。香港係個非常特殊嘅社會,如果你有實力、好力,最終一定可以發達。

Tuesday, August 07, 2007

投資銀行(Bear Stearns)將收 Margin Call?

噚日,孫柏文講過投資銀行點做「幫客出債券借錢」嘅生意。基本上,有五步。

1.投 資銀行(例如高盛、美林等)問商業銀行(例如滙豐、花旗等)借錢做本。

2.跟住再將錢借畀啲客。

3.啲客收到錢之後,就會出借據畀投資銀行。

4.投資銀行 跟住將借據改名為「債券」,賣畀啲投資者,從中收佣。

5.投資銀行收到投資者買「債券」嘅錢,就會還畀商業銀行。

噚日,我亦重溫過,97年百富點解執笠。 基本上,百富借錢畀客,不過個客嘅借據賣唔出,百富要自己揸住。跟住個客出事,百富手上嘅借據大幅貶值,借錢畀佢做本嘅商業銀行,見到佢資不抵債,就發 margin call,叫百富「補倉」。百富搵唔到現金,所以就執笠。

你唔call佢call

今時今日,國際級投資銀行例 如高盛、美林等,同當年百富一樣,借咗錢畀客,不過啲客嘅借據賣唔出。百富當年要自己揸2.6億美元嘅債券,今時今日嘅投資銀行就揸5000億美元嘅債 券。

當然,大家可能會話:「只要投資銀行被迫揸住嘅債券,冇好似百富嗰啲咁大幅貶值,應該冇事。」咁我就要反問,如果你係商業銀行嘅人,借咗錢畀啲投資銀 行,清楚明白投資銀行現在手持大量債券作資產。不過,債市冇成交,所以冇市價,你作為商業銀行嘅人,你會點做?

如無意外,就應該打電話畀投資銀行,叫佢哋 清楚列明有乜嘢債券喺手,跟住幫佢哋計一計數,如果資不抵債,就發margin call,叫佢哋還錢。

大家要記得,一間投資銀行會同好多間商業銀行借錢,如果你係第一間發margin call嘅商業銀行,將來可能會被抵制。不過,如果間投資銀行真係出事,你發margin call發得遲,投資銀行還唔到錢,咁就賠上十億八億。

60層帝景園又如何

6 月25日,喺我嗰篇題為「Bear Stearns大鑊」嘅《金手指》裏面,曾經將Bear Stearns比喻為一個97年炒幾百層舊山頂道帝景園嘅叔父。

大家可能記得,當時Bear Stearns有兩個佢哋管理嘅對冲基金出事,嗰兩個對冲基金,就好似個細姪走去炒層帝景園一樣。點知,個細姪唔掂,銀行要將佢嗰層帝景園銀主盤拍賣。最 弊拍賣時,啲人出價居然係細姪買入價嘅五折。

個叔父知道,如果因今次拍賣,所有帝景園單位價值要mark低50%,佢自己都唔掂,所以,叔父就出手硬食, 將自己手頭上帝景園嘅單位數量進一步推高。不過,就算好似當年揸60層帝景園嘅「豪宅大王」秦錦釗一樣,個市要跌,揸60層都係螳臂擋車。

去到呢度,孫柏文再問多次,如果你係借咗錢畀Bear Stearns嘅商業銀行職員,你會點做?

PS. Bear Stearns is talking to CITIC for a cash injection... Wonder whats going to happen next

Monday, August 06, 2007

債市心已停 百富勤翻版?

如果大家有睇花旗財經台CNBC,都應該知佢哋有個前高盛、做過對冲基金經理嘅主持人叫做Jim Cramer。特區凌晨時分,紐約禮拜五2:45pm,孫柏文喺 屋企睇CNBC,就見到Cramer進入瘋狂狀態,破口大罵聯儲局局長伯南克。

大罵原因,原來Cramer從眾投資銀行嘅頭目口中,聽到花旗國嘅債市,已 經到達心臟停頓嘅狀態。Cramer要求聯儲局立刻放水,如果唔放,佢怕投資銀行將會血流成河。

大家可能會問:「究竟債市停頓有幾大鑊?」如果大家要明有 幾大鑊,首先就要知道投資銀行點幫啲公司出債券借錢。第一步,投資銀行會同想借錢嘅公司傾還款條件、利息等,達成協議之後,投資銀行就會保證嗰間公司,一 定可以借到錢。間公司亦同時會開出稱為「債券」嘅借據畀間投資銀行,投資銀行承諾包銷。所以投資銀行亦被稱為「包銷商」。

投 資銀行賺錢方法,就係將啲借據再賣畀投資者,從中收佣。

包銷商做咗債主

不過如果投資者唔肯買啲借據,投資銀行因為應承咗包銷,所以要自己硬食。不過,因為投資銀行啲資金 未能回籠,所以唔可以再幫其他企業借錢。呢個情況就等如債市心臟停頓,特區嘅百富喺97年都發生過。今日就為大家提供當年百富,同今日啲投資銀行嘅對比。 (見附表)



後記:大家要記得,97年百富輸咗2.6億美元執笠。即係,借錢畀百富做生意嘅銀行,都只係輸咗幾億。今時今日啲投資銀行,已借出但未賣出嘅包銷債券額,達到5000億美元,借錢畀佢哋嘅商業銀行(incl. HSBC)又會點?

大家要知道,直至禮拜五,所有花旗國投資銀行為自己出嘅債券買賣價,已經反映「垃圾評級」, 等如市場相信啲投資銀行會執笠。大家明白點解Cramer要聯儲局立刻放水啦!

Sunday, August 05, 2007

iTulip's response to Cramer's 4 Aug outburst...

Well I blogged about how Jim Cramer had a fine outburst on CNBC on Friday. Which from the point of his out burst (around 2:45pm EDT) till the market closed at 4pm. The Dow dropped 200 pts.

This is iTulip's response...




But the last question is an intriguing question indeed...

Will banks be allowed to fail like industrial companies if they face failure.

Or will the prevention of "systemic risks" rule over everything. I dunno... maybe ask Joseph Yam? Let's face it, there are no sector of the economy in all "free market economies" that are more controlled and micro managed by (non-elected?) central banks than the financial sector.

$1 trillion evaporated (doesn't include Thurs and Friday's action)

This how bad the credit crunch is right now

Want to know how bad things are on bond desks everywhere?

Watch this video of Jim Cramer on CNBC's "Stop Trading!"

He is hearing something that is pretty bad...

Promo for Money Cafe with me...

Thanks to "經濟學巨人" He loves me...

Friday, August 03, 2007

多謝冠一兄!

多謝王冠一兄嘅安慰,正當孫柏文被網友打到口腫面腫之際,冠一兄用文字出嚟扶一扶我,孫柏文深感多謝,而令我安慰嘅一句,就係冠一兄話星期一沽滙控,勝負孰未可料!

Hedge Fund、Disco、幼稚園

孫柏文問大家:「今時今日,究竟對冲基金、特區的士高、牟利幼稚園有乜共同點?」大家會點答?

如果係《金手指》嘅fan屎,睇見對冲基金同特區的士高,應該會估佢哋嘅共通點係,呢排都有好多間同時執笠。Fan屎亦會將邏輯伸延,估到牟利幼稚園都一樣。噚日,《蘋果日報》都有報道關於幼稚園倒閉嘅事,其中講過私立獨立幼稚園協會主席胡肖霞女士決定執咗轄下荃灣聖德肋撒幼稚園。

孫柏文作為獅子山學會嘅研究總監,年初被私立獨立幼稚園協會邀請參加一個活動,畀個機會我去分享,我對點樣爭取幼稚園學券可以用喺牟利幼稚園身上嘅見解。

最令我印象深刻嘅事,發生喺活動之後嘅一個晚宴之中。當時,我要去洗手間,就問胡主席,洗手間喺邊度。胡主席答嘅時候,好詳細咁教我點樣行、去到邊度要轉彎,指示清晰,令孫柏文深深感受到,呢一班幼稚園教育工作者每日對住學生嘅嗰份愛。如果可以搵到女仔肯同我結婚生仔,我絕對希望可以有胡主席般嘅教育家,去培育我嘅小朋友。

所以我睇到嗰段新聞嘅第一個反應,就係覺得非常可惜。不過,最可惜唔係胡主席執咗間幼稚園咁簡單,而係背後嘅理由。當時嘅李國章局長推行「毒學券」,因為家長唔可以用學券選擇「牟利幼稚園」,所以令好多家長面對龐大利誘,去歧視啲教小朋友教得好好,面對10%盈利上限嘅「牟利幼稚園」(「非牟利幼稚園」嘅盈利上限係5%)。李國章局長毒死咗啲教得好嘅幼稚園,又再一次損害無法脫離本港制度嘅小朋友嘅未來。

執笠非因教得差

一班每日喺前線教育小朋友,培育我哋香港未來嘅教育工作者,唔係因為教得唔好而要執笠,而係因為新任局長孫明揚未能(唔想?)撥亂反正,唔可惜咩?

一對夫婦,生仔生女,基本上只會有一個希望,就係希望仔女長大咗之後,可以自力更生、為社會作出一點貢獻。培育小朋友係一個十年二十年嘅工程,我作為一個29就嚟30歲嘅人,政府真係覺得我對香港教育制度有信心到達可以考慮生兒育女咩?大佬,點生呀?

Thursday, August 02, 2007

無能抗大跌的原因

特區股市當中最唔科學,不過股民又覺得最準確嘅前瞻性警報指標,孫柏文相信係每一次見到有鄭少秋飾演嘅電視劇開始出街。呢個「一播就股市唔掂」嘅信念,已經被股民稱為「秋官效應」。

如果追溯歷史,鄭少秋演戲幾十年,其實係去到90年代初先至有「秋官效應」出現。咁奠定「秋官效應」嘅電視劇,就係當年好受歡迎,描述由70年代開始,香港股市風風雨雨嘅《大時代》。後來呢個劇集重複又重複咁播,所以絕對算係我哋嘅集體回憶。

《大 時代》當中,相信最令觀眾難忘嘅一幕,就係鄭少秋飾演嘅「丁蟹」,將自己四個親生仔掟落街。丁蟹要將四個仔掟落街嘅原因,就係因賭期指輸大錢。而丁蟹輸大 錢嘅方法,就係因為佢「一注獨沽拋期指」,不過股市之後大升特升,所以輸清光。(大家作為《金手指》嘅fan屎,係咪好似似曾相識?)

雖然喺《大時代》當中,丁蟹係癲嘅,不過佢絕對唔蠢。當時佢造淡倉,沽期指,係做足功課,知道有龐大利淡嘅外圍因素圍繞住香港股市(係咪又好似似曾相識?)。不過,丁蟹造淡之後,居然出現香港「三大孖沙」韋家誠、郭英中、賀新出手聯合入市,操控市場,夾硬推高恒生指數。

如 果大家未睇過,可能會問:「點解三大孖沙要無端端造市,將指數推高?」故事因由,《大時代》當中有另一個角色叫做「方展博」,而三大孖沙當年就係靠方展博 老竇出手,先可到股市集資,將自己公司上市。不過最後丁蟹害死咗方爸爸,亦同時變成方展博嘅仇人。故事中,方展博向三大孖沙求助,希望佢哋可以入市,而三 大孖沙就抱住報答恩人嘅心態,將指數推高,夾死咗丁蟹呢個大淡友。

故事中,方展博向大孖沙求助嘅一幕,絕對可以相信如果唔係有見面地點環境嘅幫助,三大孖沙係唔會出手。大淡友丁蟹亦會贏大錢。方展博同三大孖沙會面,咁究竟喺邊度,可以令人對特區股市,產生大手入市嘅慾望?

冇錯,就係皇后碼頭!

噚日恒指跌七百幾點,大家知點解啦……

他們聚集在皇后碼頭不是想保衛集體回憶,他們其實是在商談如何大舉入市,奈何全日都被警察滋擾。股市不跌先至奇!

Wednesday, August 01, 2007

明燈講滙豐 網友齊發功

前日早上,孫柏文寫咗篇題為《一注獨沽賣滙豐》嘅文,如果大家有睇開財經版,都可 能知滙豐控股(005)亦係前日下午出業績。

前日我話過,因為今年7月1日之後,所有風險級別嘅花旗國次按債券,債價都大跌,所以滙豐一定要將手頭上嘅次 按重新估值。亦喺篇文裏面話:

建議沽出:滙豐控股(005) 目標價:112.5港元 年期:12個月

咁滙豐管理層報上半年業績,比預期理想,連對下半年嘅前景都非常樂觀,滙豐股價就當然節節上升。

我喺《一注獨沽賣滙豐》篇文章嘅股價預測, 未靈驗,用噚日嘅收市價嚟計算,簡直就係錯晒。

前晚開始,我已經非常depressed。作為一個大情大性嘅人,同事亦感受到我嘅悲哀,而前晚寫完稿之 後,喺廁所碰到個好有同情心嘅同事,佢亦有慰問我。

佢話:「孫柏文,我覺得你今日出街嗰篇《一注獨沽賣滙豐》,對你都唔係衰得晒。」
我(站在尿兜前,向下望):「衰呀,衰晒呀。」
佢話:「你諗吓,起碼證監唔會查你有內幕消息呀!」

當然,除咗有同事嘅關心,好多網友都同樣有慰問我。以下收錄咗啲最sweet嘅網上留言,同我嘅回應。

比秋官還厲害

tintinbright: 「When I read your column today, I already think HSBC will 大步檻過, you are such a super genie (not genius ah!), 超級燈神!! Please write in Apple forever, 淨看你的column已值回$6有餘。」我嘅回應:「I shall transfer your comments to my boss。」

要發達呀:「Some financial writers have special body functions,so that they can write with their arse and shit with their brain。」

gk3328:「佢比秋官還厲害。」我嘅回應:「厲害過秋官?oh no…」

bobochan2:「條友咁勁有冇成副身家去put大象!」我嘅回應:「有…成袋put,成手血。」

S2k:「人叫柏文佢叫柏文,姓柯就受歡 迎,姓孫就傷感情。」

笨象不笨 飛象識飛

I want to share today's piece by my financial commentator mentor Mr. 王冠一

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笨象不笨 飛象識飛

港股認真神乎其技,上周借美股急跌先殺班好友,然後藉美股周一喘定(漠視上周五再跌),再「挾」班淡友。恒指昨日借滙控(005)業績「驕人」殺番上 23000點之上,兩日共挾614點,短短時間來個「V形」殺倉,誠高手也!

滙控上半年業績超市場預期,無論是捧場客、情意結者或有心人都或會抬舉下這隻 大笨象,令佢開心到跳舞才對,昨日收144.3元,升2%,一洗頹氣,實在可喜可賀。

然而,更值得高興的是大笨象的哎吔乖仔「小飛象」──恒生銀行 (011)的小股東。恒生在各方力捧之下,股價昨飆升「三條煙」,即11.1元或9.83%,至124元收市,是9年來錄得單日最大升幅,藍籌股中無出其 右者。

那麼,為甚麼滙控升幅居然被恒生拋離?話明識飛,你估「流」o架?恒生預期市盈率18.6倍,佢老竇滙控得嗰12.7倍,相比起潛力不遑多讓,有過 之而無不及的中銀(2388)的15.2倍,多出逾3倍。雖然比中行(3988)的19.1倍少,但人家未見真章且內力深厚,難道恒生真的如斯吸引?

如果 唔係,則肯定是滙控不太爭氣了!何出此言?盈利中有10億美元來自非經常性收益,這個不談也罷,但從行政總裁紀於發佈會中強調,「三腳櫈」(歐、美、亞 洲)變「兩條腿」──一條是歐美,另一是亞洲、中東及拉美之說,符合滙控長遠利益來衡量,太依賴和focus在被動兼脆弱的新興國家,對滙控盈利前景會否 構成難以估計的影響,不妨三思。至於北美次按又是另一不明朗因素,睇好睇淡,悉隨尊便。不過呢次冠一要撐「金手指」孫柏文。雖然講到一半也可能夠殺,請不必氣餒,也不宜妄自菲薄,昨日沽滙控,勝負孰未可料!

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He is a wise man.

Jim Cramer's advice for US home owners facing interest rate resets + negative equity - walk away...



2/28 that Cramer refers to, is when a 30 years mortgage, the first 2 years have low or no interest payment, then the "interest rate adjusts" for the remaining 28 years. Hence called Adjustable rate mortgages.

He is saying that the ARMs will ALL go bust when the crest of it arrives in Oct 07 to Feb 08. ALL... 100%... He said that the bears (that includes me?) expects 50% only... he expects 100%. Let me find out how bad it is. I last remembered it be about a many of billions.

Anyhow, Geoghegan has said that they don't do fancy mortgages such as ARMs (Adjustable rate mortgages). So he is implying that HSBC will be immune.

But when house prices drop 20%, he will realize that the US ain't HK where people will heroically keep on their house payments. Also, when it drops 20%, even prime turns into subprime.

And I will, like Cramer, also stop using the word "subprime" and 次按 to describe the US housing problem. It is now simply a "mortgage" 按揭 problem.

Anyhow, some of you have criticize me to focus only on mortgage lending in the US.

My friend, watch the UK. That's the next shoe to drop. When it does, I will pounce.

I am contrite on my timing. But I stand by my call.


This is the world famous graph prepared earlier this year by the good people over at Credit Suisse.

We are in month number 8